Systematically and carefully designed information security metrics can be used to provide evidence of the security solutions of the system under development. The lack of appropriate security solutions in softwareintensive systems might have serious consequences for businesses and the stakeholders. We investigate holistic development of security metrics based on security requirement decomposition and ontologies. The high-level security requirements are expressed in terms of lower-level measurable components applying a decomposition approach. Security requirement analysis of a distributed messaging system is used as an example.
INTRODUCTION
Information security is clearly a challenging systemlevel problem. One cannot accurately determine the information security requirements outside the context and environment of the target system. Building security requirements is often a process of making trade-off decisions especially between high security, high usability and low cost.
The rest of this paper is organized into the following sections. Section 2 presents the metrics development approach and different parts of it. Section 3 discusses related work and finally, Section 4 summarizes the study with some future research questions and conclusions.
PROPOSED APPROACH
In this study, we use the following iterative process for security metrics development, partly based on Savola (2007) . The steps for the process are as follows: 1. Carry out threat and vulnerability analysis.
Carry out threat analysis of the system under investigation and its use environment (use cases). Identify known or suspected vulnerabilities. 2. Define and prioritize security requirements in a holistic way based on threat analysis. The most critical security requirements should be paid the most attention. Pay attention to the coherence of requirements. 3. Identify basic measurable components from the higher-level requirements using a decomposition approach. 4. Define measurement architecture for on-line metrics and evidence collection mechanisms for off-line metrics. 5. Select basic measurable components based on e.g. feasibility and importance. 6. Apply suitable metrics ontologies to the chosen basic measurable components to plan the actual metrics development. 7. Develop appropriate off-line and on-line security metrics, and the functionalities and processes where they are used. Note that all steps are highly iterative and the sequence of the steps can be varied. Steps 1 and 2 should be started as early as possible in the system development process and elaborated iteratively as the system design gets more mature. Steps 3 and 4 can be carried out in parallel to each other.
Step 4 can also be started partially already during the architectural design phase of the system.
Threat and Vulnerability Analysis
Threat analysis is the process of determining the relevant threats to a System Under Investigation (SUI). The outcome of the threat analysis process is a description of the threat situations. In practice, there are many ways to carry out threat analysis, from simply enumerating threats to modelling them in a rigorous way. The extent of threat analysis depends, e.g., on the criticality of the use cases in SUI. The following threat and vulnerability analysis process can be used, based on the Microsoft threat risk modelling process (Howard and LeBlanc, 2003) 
Definition and Prioritization of Security Requirements
Security requirements derive from threats, policies and environment properties. Security requirements that are derived from threats are actually countermeasures. Policies are security relevant directives, objectives and design choices that are seen necessary for the system under investigation. Environment properties contribute to the security of the SUI from outside. In general, every security risk due to a threat chosen to be cancelled or mitigated must have a countermeasure in the collection of security requirements.
A security requirement of the SUI r i is derived from applicable threat(s) θ i , policies p i and the environment properties e i :
where R is the collection of all security requirements of SUI, Θ is the collection of all security threats chosen to be cancelled or mitigated, P is the collection of all security policies applied to SUI, and E is the collection of all environment properties that contribute to the security of the SUI from outside.
Decomposition of Security Requirements
The core activity in the proposed security metrics development process is in decomposing the security requirements. In the following, we discuss the decomposition process and give an example of it.
The following decomposition process, based on Wang and Wulf (1997) , is used to identify measurable components from the security requirements: 1. Identify successive components from each security requirement (goal) that contribute to the success of the goal. 2. Examine the subordinate nodes to see if further decomposition is needed. If so, repeat the process with the subordinate nodes as current goals, breaking them down to their essential components. 3. Terminate the decomposition process when none of the leaf nodes can be decomposed any further, or further analysis of these components is no longer necessary. When the decomposition terminates, all leaf nodes should be measurable components. In the following, we decompose the requirements presented above and discuss the results. Since adaptive security contains higher-level requirements, we leave it to the last. It is easier to investigate the six lower-level requirement categories first.
In general, the model depicted in Fig. 1 can be used for the authentication decomposition (Wang and Wulf, 1997) during the process of identifying potential metrics for authentication performance. See (Savola and Abie, 2009 ) for a more detailed discussion of security requirement decomposition and identification of basic measurable components.
Measurement Architecture and Evidence Collection
The next step requires identification of measurable information and the mechanisms how to obtain and process that data. Both on-line and off-line evidence collection should be designed. In many cases, online and off-line measurements can be dependent on each other. Identification of measurable information can be carried out, e.g., from data flow diagrams and protocol descriptions. As an example, Fig. 2 shows a conceptual picture of information flows of a distributed messaging system GEMOM, Genetic Message Oriented Secure Middleware (Abie et al., 2008) . Security metrics of the Security Monitor module can use information from the Broker module, Audit and Logging module and Security module. In addition, the metrics get information from memory, storage and network interfaces. 
Feasibility and Importance of Metrics
According to Jelen (2000), a good metric is Specific (well-defined, using unambiguous wording), Measurable (quantitative when feasible), Attainable (within budgetary and technical limitations), Repeatable (measurements from which metric is derived do not vary depending on the person taking them) and Time-dependent (takes into consideration measurements from multiple time slices) ("SMART"). Payne (2006) remarks that truly useful security metrics indicate the degree to which security goals, such as data confidentiality, are being met.
The feasibility of measuring security and developing security metrics to present actual security phenomena has been criticized in many contributions. In designing a security metric, one has to be conscious of the fact that the metric simplifies a complex socio-technical situation down to numbers or partial orders. McHugh (2002) is skeptical of the side effects of such simplification and the lack of scientific proof. Bellovin (2006) remarks that defining metrics is hard, if not infeasible, because an attacker's effort is often linear, even in cases where exponential security work is needed. Another source of challenges is that luck plays a major role (Burris, 2000) especially in the weakest links of information security solutions. Those pursuing the development of a security metrics program should think of themselves as pioneers and be prepared to adjust strategies as experience dictates (Payne, 2000) .
Use of Metrics Ontologies
After the decomposition of security requirements, metrics ontologies can be used to help in planning the actual metrics development process. Fig. 3 . shows an example metrics ontology for reliability metrics, see example in Fig. 3 (Niemelä et al., 2008) . Reliability can be seen at the leaf of the authentication taxonomy of Fig. 1 . From the example reliability metrics ontology, it can be seen that there are reliability metrics that emphasize either strengths or weaknesses. Strength metrics can be divided into maturity metrics, normal case metrics and abnormal case metrics. (Niemelä et al., 2008) . Wang and Wulf (1997) (Black, 2006) seeks to help answer various questions on software assurance, tools and metrics. OWASP (2009) (Open Web Application Security Project) contains an active discussion and development forum on security metrics. More security metrics approaches are surveyed in (Savola, 2007) and (Savola, 2008) .
RELATED WORK

CONCLUSIONS
The field of developing security metrics systematically is young and the current practice of information security is still a highly diverse field, and holistic and widely accepted approaches are still missing.
We have introduced a novel methodology for security metrics development based on threats, policies, security requirements and requirement decomposition. The developed approach enables to describe and relate different types of security metrics in a systematic way.
Further work is needed in definition of the measurement architecture, evidence collection and selection of measurable components. Methods to assess the importance, feasibility and complexity of security metrics are needed. Furthermore, more detailed metrics to the system under investigation should be developed and validated in the actual system. The future work includes more thorough investigation of suitable generic decomposition models.
